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Pendley: Allocating Buried Treasure: Federal Litigation Involving Intersta

COMMENT
ALLOCATING BURIED TREASURE:' FEDERAL
LITIGATION INVOLVING INTERSTATE
GROUND WATER*
In 1974 the Wyoming State Legislature passed and sent
to the Governor, Senate Bill Number 14, popularly known
as "the Coal Slurry Pipeline bill."2 The law had a number
of provisions dealing with the use of Wyoming water, the
most significant of which authorized the annual appropriation of 20,000 acre-feet of ground water from the Madison
Formation underlying northeastern Wyoming by a foreign
corporation. The water would be used to transport finely
ground coal through a pipeline from Wyoming to Arkansas.'
At first the law was greeted with enthusiasm as an ecologically sound, environmentally pure method of transporting
Wyoming's coal. Soon however, larger unanswered questions
arose: What kind of water was this? How much would be
lost? What was the origin of the water within the formation? Would certain surface areas suffer as a result of the
pumping from the underground store?
Yet perhaps the most important question was one which
had implications beyond Wyoming's border: Whose water
was it?' The state of South Dakota was concerned: Was
Wyoming using South Dakota water? Interstate litigation
appeared imminent.'
Copyright@ 1976 by the University of Wyoming

1.

2.
3.
4.

5.

*This comment was financed by the Water Resources Research Institute of
the University of Wyoming.
Mr. Justice Holmes, delivering the opinion of the United States Supreme
Court in New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 836, 342 (1931), wrote: "A
river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure. It offers a necessity of
life that must be rationed among those who have power over it."
WYo. STAT. § 41-10.5 (Supp. 1975).
WYO. STAT. § 41-10.5 (Supp. 1975).
That the answer to this question was uncertain seems clear from the statement of proponents of the law that Wyoming should make use of the water
before South Dakota attempted appropriation. Candidates Exchange Blows
on Pipeline, Casper Star Tribune (Casper, Wyoming), July 30, 1974, at 1,
Col. 1.
There are numerous ground water basins over which such litigation could
arise, for example, the Ogallala Formation beneath Texas and New Mexico.
See BITTINGER & JONES, MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF, GROUND
WATER IN INTERSTATE AQUIFERS, PHASE II (Report financed by U. S. Dept.
of the Interior; authorized under Water Resources Research Act of 1964)
1-12 (1974).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1976

1

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 11 [1976], Iss. 1, Art. 3

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XI

The potential legal conflict between South Dakota and
Wyoming over the ownership and use of ground water could
well foreshadow a plethora of such cases. Rather than preventing the likelihood of such conflicts, the problems and
pressures of a modern age have forced upon the nation, and
particularly the arid West, the need for more and more
sources of water and with it the possibility of head to head
conflict between states over such sources. It is estimated
that there is 8,293 times as much water in the ground as in
all of the earth's streams and 3,680 times as much water in
the first twenty-five hundred feet below the surface.' It is
to this source which the nation-pressed for water-must
turn.
Like its brother on the surface, ground water does not
recognize the artificial, political boundaries which men and
nations have devised.7 However, while surface water has
been exposed to much history and development over its allocation and management in interstate and international situations, with the resultant compacts, treaties and court orders,
ground water concepts have remained undeveloped.8 Like
the returning prodigal son, ground water must now, in the
light of the growing demand for water, share equally in the
attention and concern formerly given only to surface water
Until very recently, little has been written with regard to
the management aspects of ground water and the real potential for interstate ground water confrontations."0 Those com6. Lof, Potential Applications of New Water Technology in the West, in
RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT: FRONTIERS FOR RESEARCH, PAPERS OF THE WESTSee BALDWIN &
ERN RESOURCES CONFERENCE (Boulder, Colo.) 1959 (1960).
McGUINNESS, A PRIMER ON GROUND WATER (U. S. Dept. of the Interior
Geological Survey) (1963); NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES

FOR THE FUTURE (1973); McGUINNESS, THE ROLE OF GROUND WATER IN THE
NATIONAL WATER SITUATION (Geological Survey Water-Supply Paper No.

1800) (1963); Nace, World's Estimated Water Supply, 7-8 UNESCO
Courier (July-Aug. 1964), at 12.
7. Fischer, Management of Interstate Ground Water, 7 NAT. RES. LAW. 521,
545 (1974); Moses, The Law of Ground Water-Does Modern Buried
Treasure Create A New Breed of Pirates? 11 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 277,
300 (1966).
8. Fischer, supra note 7, at 523; Moses, supra note 7, at 277.
9. Luke 15:11-32.
10.

BITTINGER & MOSES, MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF GROUND WATER
IN INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL AQUIFERS, PHASE I (Report financed

by U. S. Dept. of the Interior; authorized under Water Resources Research
Act of 1964) 11-2, 3 (1970); Fischer, supra note 7, at 523; Moses, supra
note 7, at 277.
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mentators who have examined these matters have propounded
a number of possible solutions providing for the equitable
allocation of the resource: uniform ground water laws, reciprocal state legislation, federal legislation, informal agreements, federal litigation and interstate compacts. 1 However,
just as most commentators feel that the best solution would
be that of the interstate compact, so they feel that such a
solution is unlikely. As Ward H. Fischer writes in his recent
article, Management of Interstate Ground Water:
Our conclusion must be that the interstate
compact is by far the most effective, most sound,
most flexible, and over-all most satisfactory approach that can be recommended. Regrettably, our
conclusions must also be that, between these two
alternatives, it is also the less likely; that litigation
between the states resulting in equitable apportionment of available ground waters can be expected
unless there is an unprecedented awakening to responsibility and to reality among the water users
and water administrators of the affected states. 2
If such litigation results, what rules would the Court apply? What problems would the Court and the parties face?
And finally what would be the outcome? It is with these
important questions that this Comment will deal. Since no
case involving the allocation of interstate ground water has
ever reached the U. S. Supreme Court, it will be necessary
to search for the answers to the above questions by examining the Supreme Court's treatment of interstate conflicts
involving surface water.
FEDERAL LITIGATION INVOLVING RIGHTS
TO INTERSTATE STREAMS

The Jurisdictional Hurdle
The Constitution provides that the settlement of controversies between the states is a matter for the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court. Article III,
Section 2 states in part: "The judicial Power shall extend
... to Controversies between two or more States." The first
11. Fischer, supra note 7, at 528-45; Moses, supra note 7, at 303.
12. Fischer, supra note 7, at 546.
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application of original jurisdiction over a controversy involving the waters of an interstate stream took place in
Kansas v. Colorado.13 In that case, the Court, after a lengthy
discussion of the origins of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction
in the matter, held:
One cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of
the States to each other, is that of equality of right.
Each State stands on the same level with all the
rest. It can impose its own legislation on no one
of the others, and is bound to yield its own views
to none. Yet, whenever, as in the case of Missouri
v. Illinios, 180 U.S. 208, the action of one State
reaches through the agency of natural laws into
the territory of another State, the question of the
extent and the limitations of the rights of the two
States becomes a matter of justiciable dispute between them, and this court is called upon to settle
that dispute in such a way as will recognize the
equal rights of both and at the same time establish
justice between them. In other words, through these
successive disputes and decisions this court is practically building up what may not improperly be
called interstate common law.'
Since 1907, the Court has on numerous occasions reaffirmed its jurisdiction over interstate disputes involving
surface waters."
While the Court unquestionably holds original jurisdiction in such matters, it appears to have stated a reluctance
to enter such controversies in the absence of "the threatened
invasion of rights ... of serious magnitude ... established
by clear and convincing evidence." 6 The Court has consistently reiterated this position, most recently in Nebraska v.
13. 206 U.S. 46 (1907). It should be noted, as a purely procedural matter,
that in the settlement of disputes involving interstate streams, the Court
appoints a Special Master who, after hearings, submits a report to the
Court, containing findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations
for a decree. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Colorado v.
Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 389 (1943); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517,
519 (1936) ; Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 664 (1931).
14. 206 U.S. 46, 97-98 (1907). For an earlier analysis of conflicts over rights
to interstate streams, see Friedrich, The Settlement of Disputes Between
States Concerning Rights to the Waters of Interstate Streams, 32 IowA L.
REV. 244 (1947).
15. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 591, 610 (1945); Colorado v. Kansas,
320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 464 (1922).
16. New York v. New Jersey, 256 US. 296, 309 (1921).
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Wyoming.1" The Court has often referred to this standard
as the higher burden of proof required in litigation involving
states. As Mr. Justice Roberts wrote:
Not every matter which would warrant resort to
equity by one citizen against another would justify
our interference with the action of a state, for the
burden on the complaining state is much greater
than that generally required to be borne by private
parties."8
A further restriction on the use of the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction in controversies involving two or more
states, is the demand of the Supreme Court since Kansas v.
Coloradothat the complaining state demonstrate, "not merely
some technical right, but also a right with a corresponding
benefit."'"
The Equality of Right Principle
In the first interstate conflict over the water of a stream,
the Court announced that international law, as part of the
law of the United States, must be ascertained and administered when questions of right depend upon it and are presented to the Court for determination."0 While the Court
failed to apply any principles of international law in the
settlement of Kansas v. Colorado, it has been suggested that
the rule announced by the Court in that case and in subsequent interstate river cases could well serve as the solution
to some problems which arise from conflicting claims to
international rivers.2
What the Court did apply in attempting to resolve that
first interstate dispute over the waters of the Arkansas River
was what the Court referred to as a "cardinal rule" underlying the relations of the states with regard to each other17. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 608 (1945). Accord, Colorado v.
Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 393 (1943) ; Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 522
(1936); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 669 (1931).
18. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 393 (1943). Accord, Washington v.
Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 529 (1936); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S.
660, 669 (1931).
19. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 109 (1907). Accord, Colorado v. Kansas,
820 U.S. 383, 386 (1943); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 527 (1936).
20. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907).
21. TRELEASE, WATER LAW: RESOURCE USE & ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 66263 (2d ed. 1974), and articles cited.
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that of "equality of right".22 In delineating the manner in
which it would apply such a rule, the Court stated:
We must consider the effect of what has been done
upon the conditions in the respective states and so
adjust the dispute upon the basis of equality of
rights as to secure as far as possible to Colorado
the benefits of irrigation without depriving Kansas
of the like beneficial effects of a flowing stream.
(emphasis added)."
However, the "equality of right" announced by the
Court referred "not to an equal division of the water, but
to the equal level or plane on which all the States stand, in
point of power and right, under our constitutional system.""
In Connecticut v. Massachusetts, the Court again declared
that the standard to be observed by the Court is one of
"equitable allocation" applied after a consideration of the
25
contentions of the states and other relevant facts.
Thus from the incipience of this type of litigation, the
Court has appeared willing to enter into a balancing process
to achieve the announced "equality of right":
[W]hen we compare the amount of this detriment
[to Southwestern Kansas] with the great benefit
which has obviously resulted to the counties in Colorado, it would seem that equality of right and equity
between the two states forbids any interference
with the present withdrawal of water in Colorado
for purposes of irrigation. "6
The Court's predilection to balance in these cases seems apparent from the words of Mr. Justice Holmes in New Jersey
v. New York: "the effort always is to secure an equitable
apportionment without quibbling over formulas." 7
Kansas v. Colorado, 206, U.S. 46, 97 (1907).
Id. at 100.
Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 465 (1922).
Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670-71 (1931).
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 114 (1907). Acco'd, Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 622 (1945); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 523
(1936).
27. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 343 (1931).

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
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Equality Defined-The Doctrine of Prior Appropriation
While the Court has frequently stated its adherence to
the doctrine of "equitable apportionment, ' 2- the meaning of
the phrase is not apparent on its face. In Wyoming v. Colorado, a case involving two prior appropriation states, Mr.
Justice Van Devanter, writing for the Court concluded that:
Colorado's objections to the doctrine of appropriation as a basis of decision are not well taken, and
that it furnishes the only basis which is consonant
with the principles of right and equity applicable
to such a controversy as this is. The cardinal rule
of the doctrine is that priority of appropriation
gives superiority of right. 9
In Nebraska v. Wyoming, a case involving the prior appropriation states of Nebraska, Wyoming and Colorado, the
Court wrote "[t]he equitable apportionment which Nebraska
seeks is based on the principle of priority of appropriation
applied interstate."3 The Court referred to the above language of Mr. Justice Van Devanter and then held that since
the states involved were appropriation states, the principle
announced in Wyoming v. Colorado was applicable.3
However, the application of the principle of prior appropriation did not mean that there was to be a literal application of the priority rule. 2 As the Court declared:
Apportionment calls for the exercise of an informed
judgment on a consideration of many factors. Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle. But
physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive
use of water in the several sections of the river, the
character and rate of return flows, the extent of
established uses, the availability of storage water,
the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream
areas, the damage to upstream areas as compared
28.
29.
30.

31.
32.

Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 599 (1945) ; Colorado v. Kansas, 320
U.S. 383, 385 (1943); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 671
(1931); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 470 (1922).
Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 470 (1922).
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 599 (1945). Although Nebraska was
originally a riparian state, the appropriation system was enacted with
recognition given to prior existing riparian rights. In this case, however,
only rights based upon appropriation were involved. Id. at 599.
Id. at 617.
Id. at 618.
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to the benefits to downstream areas if a limitation
is imposed on the former-these are all relevant
factors. They are merely an illustrative, not an exhaustive catalogue."
The Court, in analyzing the circumstances of the case
before it, announced again that while prior appropriation
was the guiding principle it was not a hard and fast rule
and stated: "Colorado's countervailing equities indicate it
should not be strictly adhered to in this situation."34
While the Supreme Court has frequently stated its adherence to the doctrine of equitable apportionment with priority of appropriation as the basis for division in appropriation states," the approach of the Court in a conflict involving an interstate stream flowing through riparian states is
as yet uncertain. However, language in the Court's decision
of Connecticut v. Massachusetts, a suit in which the Court
dismissed Connecticut's complaint, appears to indicate that
even in a riparian state, the Court would apply the doctrine
of prior appropriation. Connecticut contended, in seeking
to enjoin a Massachusetts diversion of waters from the
watershed of the Connecticut River, that under the riparian
law in force in both states, each owner had a vested right
to the use of the flowing waters of the river. The Court
however, ruled:
[T]he laws in respect of riparian rights that happen to be effective for the time being in both States
do not necessarily constitute a dependable guide or
just basis for the decision of controversies such as
that here presented .... The determination of the
relative rights of contending States in respect of
the uses of streams flowing through them does not
depend upon the same considerations and is not
governed by the same rules of law that are applied
in such States for the solution of similar questions
of private right. ... And, while the municipal law
relating to like questions between individuals is to
be taken into account, it is not to be deemed to have
33. Id.
34. Id. at 622.
35. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 599 (1945); Arizona v. California,
298 U.S. 558 (1936); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 526 (1936).
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controlling weight. As was shown in Kansas v.
Colorado (citation omitted), such disputes are to
be settled on the basis of equality of right."
Thus, the Court concluded that in such a case the proper basis
for decision would be one of equitable apportionment of the
waters given the contention of the states and all relevant
facts."7
The Equity Factors
While the Court has declared that the apportionment is
to be an "equitable" one, it has failed to specifically delineate the equities to be weighed. 8 Thus an analysis of interstate disputes over surface waters is necessary to ascertain
the factors considered by the Supreme Court.
The Court has demonstrated a willingness to consider
the reliance which a state, engaged in diversion, puts upon
the water diverted as well as the dependency of the area's
or state's economy upon such water. In Kansas v. Colorado,
after a careful examination of tables revealing population
growth, acres cultivated and value of farm products, the
Court declared:
These tables disclose a very marked development
in the population, area of land cultivated and
amount of agricultural products. Whatever has
been effective in bringing about this development
is certainly entitled to recognition, and should not
be wantonly or unnecessarily destroyed or interfered with. That this development is largely owing
to irrigation is something of which from a consideration of the testimony there can be no reasonable
doubt. 9
Twenty-nine years later, Mr. Justice Cardozo cited similar
considerations in denying the complaint of Washington:
36. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670 (1931).
37. Id. at 670-71.
38. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 394 (1943). As to the date on which the
equities are considered, the Court declared "all the factors which create
equities in favor of one State or the other must be weighed as of the date
when the controversy is mooted." The Court did, of course, enumerate some
factors to be considered in Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945).
39. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 109 (1907).
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To restrain the diversion at the bridge would bring
distress and even ruin to a long established settlement of tillers of the soil for no other or better purpose than to vindicate a barren right. This is not
the high equity that moves the conscience of the
court in giving judgment between states.4"
As was seen from the language of Kansas v. Colorado,
the Court appears willing to examine population and agricultural production trends in finding a dependence upon the
water in question.41 In conjunction with its inquiry into
which state appears to have benefitted more from the use
of the contested water, the Court will inquire into "[t]he
question ... [of] whether the waters when diverted are misapplied or wasted with ensuing loss to the complainant."42
Thus, it would appear that the Court demands of the party
states-at least if all are appropriation states-a use of the
water that is "reasonable, beneficial and necessary.""3 While
a state which makes such use of the water may, at least
theoretically, lose the water due to the type of balancing
employed in Kansas v. Colorado, the Court looks first to the
exercise of rights so as to "conserve the common supply."44
Closely allied with the dependence of the area's economy
on the water and the Court's examination of agricultural
production and population trends is the Court's occasional
inquiry into the climate of the region and its resultant need
for water to continue an agricultural existence.4
The Court has declared the amount of water involved in
return flow to be a factor in equitable allocation. In Colorado
v. Kansas, the Court declared that the area under irrigation
did not afford a reliable measure of the actual consumption.
As a result of return flow, there was a "steady reduction in
the quantity of water consumed per acre of irrigated land."46
Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 523 (1936).
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 109 (1907).
Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 523-24 (1936).
Id.
Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 484 (1922).
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 594 (1945); Washington v. Oregon,
297 U.S. 517, 520 (1936).
46. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 397-98 (1943).
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
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The amount of water involved in such runoff and seepage is
not inconsequential, for as the Court declared in Nebraska
v. Wyoming, "these return flows are substantial and should
be taken into account in balancing the equities between Wyoming and Nebraska in this section of the river.""
Yet the concept of return flow may not be limited to the
river in question but may indeed encompass large regions. In
Kansas v. Colorado, the Court referred to the possibility that
the transformation of the "desert" lands of Colorado by use
of the Arkansas River had the effect, "through percolation
of water in the soil, or in any other way," of giving a benefit to Kansas, a benefit the Court felt could be as great as
Kansas would have received by allowing the Arkansas to
flow undiminished.
The Court has appeared to favor the use of water for
drinking and other domestic purposes stating that such are
"the highest uses of water.""5 The Court declared that since
the water was to be put to its "highest use," no other considerations were necessary to show that the diversion should be
allowed and Connecticut's complaint dismissed." However,
it is uncertain if the complaint would have been so easily
dismissed if Connecticut had been able to show some real
or substantial injury or damage.
Decision or Dismissal
While a number of states have filed complaints to the
Supreme Court, in pursuit of the equitable apportionment
of the waters of an interstate stream, the Court has granted
relief in only three cases.51 On two occasions the Court has
dismissed a state's complaint as dealing with only potential
invasions of rights and interests in a stream.2 In the words
of Mr. Justice Butler:
47. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 645 (1945).
48. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 100-01 (1907).
49. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 673 (1931). See Nebraska v.
Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 656 (1945), where the Court declared that there
was to be "no restriction upon the diversion . . . for ordinary and usual
domestic and municipal purposes and consumption .... "
50. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 673-74 (1931).
51. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); New Jersey v. New York, 283
U.S. 336 (1931) ; Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
52. Connecticut v. Massachustts, 282 U.S. 660, 674 (1931); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 462 (1931).
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Injunction issues to prevent existing or presently
threatened injuries. One will not be granted against
something merely feared as liable to occur at some
indefinite time in the future."8
In Nebraska v. Wyoming, the Court appeared to go be-

yond previous decisions. Despite the requirement that the
harm be real and substantial the Court granted relief in what

it recognized as a case based "essentially on evidence of
shortage and of misappropriation of water by the upper
States since 1930 and of threats of more serious shortage
and diversions in the future."

4

The Court brushed aside

the motion for dismissal declaring that since (1) a genuine
controversy existed; (2) the states were unable to reach a

settlement; and (3) water had been diverted out of priority
in an arid or semiarid region which was already overappro-

priated, it had the jurisdiction and the duty to act.5"

Another closely related rationale for dismissal, previously mentioned as a possible jurisdictional deficiency, is the
state's failure to prove the threatened invasion to be one of
"serious magnitude" as "established by clear and convincing
evidence. ' ' "

On a number of occasions, dismissal has resulted from
the Court's determination that the central government, absent from the suit, was an indispensable party to the controversy. If the United States has an interest in the river

which makes its presence essential, the doctrine of sovereign
53. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 674 (1931).
54. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 599 (1945).
55. Id. at 608-09. Mr. Justice Roberts, dissenting, asserted that the Court
should withhold its judicial power unless the circumstances demanded
intervention:
Without proof of actual damage in the past, or of any threat of
substantial damage in the near future, the court now undertakes
to assume jurisdiction over three quasi-sovereign states and to
supervise, for all time, their respective uses of an interstate stream
on the basis of past use, including, over a ten year term, the
greatest drought in the history of the region, admitting, in effect,
that its allocation of privileges to the respective states will have
to be revised and modified when that drought ceases and more
water becomes available for beneficial use. I doubt if, in such
interstate controversies, any state is ever entitled to a declaratory
judgment from this court. I am sure that, on the showing in the
present record, none of the states is entitled to a declaration of
rights. The precedent now made will arise to plague this court
not only in the present suit but in others.
Id. at 657-58.
56. Connecticut v. Massachustets, 282 U.S. 660, 669 (1931).
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immunity renders a suit impossible since the United States
cannot be sued without its consent. While the presence of
the United States cannot be compelled by the party states,
7 In two
the United States may voluntarily enter the suit.Y
cases involving interstate conflicts over surface waters, the
Court dismissed the action due to the absence of the United
States and its position as an indispensable party.58 In two
other cases, the United States intervened thus allowing the
continuance of the action."0 In yet another case, the Supreme
Court denied a motion to dismiss due to the absence of the
Secretary of the Interior-asserted by the State of Wyoming
to be an indispensable party. The Supreme Court ruled that
since the Secretary was required by law to obtain permits
from Wyoming for the use of water within the state, Wyoming therefore would stand in judgment for the Secretary
just as Wyoming would stand in judgment for any other appropriator in the state. In accordance with this rationale,
the Court ruled that the Secretary was not a necessary
60
party.
Ground Water
On only two occasions, in dealing with interstate conflicts over surface water has the Supreme Court discussed
the matter of ground water. 6 ' In Washington v. Oregon, the
plaintiff state alleged that in addition to the wrongful diversion of the waters of the Walla Walla River, the inhabitants
of the State of Oregon were sinking numerous water wells.
Therefore, Washington sought an adjudication of the interests of the two states.
On the first question, that of the wrongful diversion,
the Court adopted the finding of the Master that Washington
57. TRELEASE, supra note 21, at 681.
58. Texas v. New Mexico, 352 U.S. 991 (1957); Arizona v. California, 298 U.S.
558, 568 (1936).
59. Arizona v. California, 344 U.S. 919 (1953); New York v. New Jersey, 256
U.S. 296, 303-04 (1921).
60. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 629 (1935).
61. This is in addition to the Court's reference to the seepage of surface waters
from irrigated land back into the stream in question as in Colorado v.
Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 397 (1943), and Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S.
589, 645 (1945), and "percolation" as referred to by the Court in Kansas
v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 114-15 (1907). Certainly these waters are ground
waters.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1976

13

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 11 [1976], Iss. 1, Art. 3

116

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XI

would derive no greater benefit from the undiminished
stream than Oregon was enjoying as a result of the diversion
of its waters.6" In addition, the river in question was found
to be "an extremely wasteful channel" since much of its
waters sunk through the deep gravel and became "part of
the underground waters.""5 In balancing the equities of the
situation, the Court found for Oregon.
With regard to the matter of the wells installed by Oregon residents, the Court declared that since (1) the water
was used in reasonable quantity for the beneficial use of the
overlying lands; (2) the water was percolating rather than
in an underground stream; and (3) the water, even without
pumping, would flow away from any stream, the use of
the waters by the people of Oregon was permissible. However, the Court's conclusion seems less founded upon geological and hydrological realities than upon the absence of proof
of harm by and to the State of Washington. 4 In the words
of the Court, quoting the Master:
There is no satisfactory proof that the use of the
water from these wells materially lessens the quantity of water available for use within the State of
Washington."
In Colorado v. Kansas, the Supreme Court once again
refused to apportion the waters of the Arkansas River since
there was no proof of a serious detriment to the State of
Kansas. 6 One of the considerations which persuaded the
Court that Kansas was not suffering by the use made of the
Arkansas by the State of Colorado was the fact that "the
arid lands in western Kansas are underlaid at shallow depths
with great quantities of ground water available.., at low...
cost." 7 The Court did not discuss whether or not the ground
waters referred to were tributary to the Arkansas River. It
appears that if they were tributary, the continued "exces62. Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 522-23 (1936).
63. Id. at 523.
64. Id. at 524-26. "In saying this we do not intimate, either one way or the
other, that our conclusion would be different if the geological formation
were other than it is." Id. at 526.
65. Id. at 526.
66. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 400 (1943).
67. Id. at 399.
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sive" use of the river by Colorado could cause such ground
water to be seriously depleted or to drop to such a level that
pumping costs would materially increase.
Apportionment of Costs
The Supreme Court on only one occasion held the costs
assessible against the defendant." On two occasions the
Court required each party to pay its own costs." More recently the costs have been divided between the two party
states" ° or allocated among the states when more than two
states were involved. 1
Summary
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over disputes between states involving interstate streams, but the
Court has limited this jurisdiction by demanding of states
a higher burden of proof than is required of private litigants.
This higher burden necessitates a showing of real and substantial present harm, that is, harm of a serious magnitude
established by clear and convincing evidence. The Court has
additionally demanded the presence of the United States,
when its interest in the subject matter of the litigation makes
it an indispensable party.
Once jurisdiction has been established, the Court seeks
to apportion the waters equitably by first recognizing what
it terms an equality of right. However, the rights which the
Court balances must be rights with corresponding benefits
and not what the Court calls barren or technical rights. In
applying the doctrine of equitable allocation, the Court will
examine the following factors: the existence of an established
economy, population and agricultural trends, climate, return
flow, diligence and care, use involved. The doctrine applied
68. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 497 (1922).
69. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 674 (1931); Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U.S. 46, 118 (1907).
70. Colorado v. Kansas, 322 U.S. 708 (1944); Wyoming v. Colorado, 309 U.S.
572 (1940), enforcing Wyoming v. Colorado, 298 U.S. 573, 586 (1936);
Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 530 (1936).
71. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 657 (1945) -Wyoming - 40 %, Nebraska - 40%, Colorado - 20%; New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348
(1931)-New Jersey-35%, City of New York-35%, New York-15%,
Pennsylvania - 15%.
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is that of prior appropriation, a doctrine which the Court
seems willing to utilize even with regard to riparian states.
In the final analysis, the Court looks to the first application of the diverted water to a beneficial use since in no
case has the Court removed from a state water once diverted
and beneficially applied.
The Court has, on occasion, discussed ground water in
its decisions involving interstate surface streams. However,
the discussion has been so limited and so much at odds with
current thinking in the area that its future application
seems doubtful.
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF
EQUITABLE ALLOCATION TO INTERSTATE CONFLICTS
OVER GROUND WATER

Ground Water-A Brief Introduction"
According to most commentators, few technical areas
have been burdened with "the misinformation, misunderstanding and mysticism" which has surrounded ground water
hydrology.7" From the time of the ancients,"4 man has ascribed to ground water mysterious aspects which it does not
have: "It has been credited with moving in ways unknown
72. There are numerous recent articles on the subject of ground water and
ground water management. See, e.g., Clark, Groundwater Management:
Law and Local Response, 6 ARIz. L. REV. 178 (1965); Fischer, supra note
7, at 521; Harnsberger, Oeltjen & Fischer, Groundwater: From Windmills
to Comprehensive Public Management, 52 NEB. L. REV. 179 (1973) (hereinafter cited as HOF) ; Maloney & Plager, Florida's Ground Water: Legal
Problems in Managing A Precious Resource, 21 U. MIAMI L. REV. 751
(1967); Moses, supra note 7, at 277; Reis, A Review and Revitalization:
Concepts of Ground Water Production and Management-The California
Experience, 7 NAT. RES. J. 53 (1967); Wiel, Need of Unified Law for
Surface and Underground Water, 2 So. CAL. L. REV. 358 (1928); Young &
Bredehoeft, Digital Computer Simulation for Solving Management Problems
of Conjunctive Groundwater and Surface Water Systems, 8 WATER RES.
RESEARCH 533 (1972); Comment, Appropriation and Colorado's Ground
Water: A Continuing Dilemma? 40 U. COLO. L. REv. 133 (1967); Comment,
Ground Water Management: A Proposal for Texas, 51 TExAs L. REV. 289
(1973).
73. CORKER, GROUNDWATER LAW, MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION (National
Water Commission, Legal Study No. 6) ch. II, 39 (1971).
74. Foley, Water and the Laws of Nature, 5 U. KAN. L. REV. 492, 493 (1957),
ascribes to Seneca the statement that:
Rainfall cannot possibly be the source of springs because it penetrates only a few feet into the earth, whereas springs are fed
from deep down. As a diligent digger among my vines, I can
confirm my observation that no rain is ever so heavy as to wet
the ground at a depth more than ten feet.
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and unknowable and has always been a favorite refuge for
quacks and pseudoscientists. ' ' 71 Partially as a result of such
confusion, legal definitions 7 and ground water doctrines"
have arisen which have no logical relationship to the scientific realities of geology or hydrology.78
However, aided by rapidly developing technology and
scientific knowledge denied the founders of much of our
nation's ground water law, commentators and courts are be75. CORKER, supra note 73, at 40.
76. Courts, textwriters and legislators have often made a distinction between
water tributary to a surface stream and water which percolates. In Clark's
words:
According to this distinction, a definite underground stream has
the characteristics of a watercourse on the surface-a definite
channel with bed and banks, definite stream of water, and definite
source or sources of supply-whereas percolating waters comprise
all ground waters that do not conform to the definition of a definite
underground stream.
1 CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 28.4, at 162 (1967).
McHendrie, The Law of Underground Water, 13 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 1, 2
(1940); Comment, Appropriation and Colorado's Ground Water: A Continuing Dilemma? supra note 72, at 135. See THOMAS, THE CONSERVATION
OF GROUND WATER 247-50 (1951); Kirkwood, Appropriation of Percolating
Water, 1 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1948); Thompson & Fiedler, Some Problems
Relating to Legal Control of Use of Ground Waters, 30 J. AM. WATER
WORKS Ass'N

1049-91 (1938).

77. Fischer's recent article discloses the following "workable summaries" of
the various ground water doctrines:
Common Law Rule: The waters underlying the land are the property of the landowner who may withdraw them without reference
to the effect upon others.
Modified Common Law Rules: Most states embracing the common
law concept have modified it to avoid the harshness of its strict
application. In this article we will refer to both of the common
doctrines as variations of the 'modified common law rule,' as the
distinctions between the modified rules are more ones of emphasis
than of clear legal distinction. The modified rules include:
1. Reasonable Use Rule: Although the landowner has a right to
the full use of all of his property, including the right to the use of
the property's underground waters, he must nonetheless recognize
that adjoining owners have similar rights, which would necessarily
be affected by his unreasonable withdrawal of ground water.
2. Correlative Rights Doctrine: The landowner has the right to
make use of the waters underlying his lands, subject, however, to
the co-extensive and co-equal rights existing in adjoining landowners.

The Appropriation Doctrine: As between conflicting claimants, he
who has first put the water to beneficial use has the first right to
continue such beneficial use, without waste, and to the extent of
his former usage. By definition, such first use, being first in legal
right, cannot cause legal injury by depriving a subsequent appropriator of water in time of shortage.
Fischer, supra note 7, at 525.
For an earlier discussion of the doctrines, see McHendrie, supra note 76.
The myriad views of the courts in regard to the relative merits of
78.
the original and variously modified common law rules and the
appropriation doctrine have been vigorously applauded or vehempositions of the authors.
ently condemned, depending upon the ...
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coming increasingly aware of the characteristics of ground
water and the fact that ground water and surface water are
both part of the same hydrological cycle.79 Thus the definition cited now by most writers in the area is either one used
by scientists or one which owes its origins to a knowledge of
scientific realities.
Trelease quotes from Crosby's study in which he refers
to the definition given by Professor Walton:
Water that exists in the interstices of rocks is called
subsurface water * * *; that part of subsurface
water in interstices completely saturated with
water is called groundwater.s"
One writer cites to McGuinness' definition:
Ground water is the water of the zone of saturation
. . . under hydrostatic pressure in the pores and
crevices of the rocks that is free to move under the
influence of gravity from places where it enters...
to places where it is discharged."s
Whether waters are tributary to natural streams or enclosed in
impervious basins and whether or not the water can correctly be
classified as seepage waters or as waters of deep percolation, are
similar problems with which courts and lawyers have wrestled.
Fischer, supra note 7, at 521.
However, in addition, the entire thrust of the courts' ground water approach, that of distinguishing between surface water and ground water,
and even within ground water itself has been assaulted with increasing
frequency recently as in total ignorance of the nature of the resource. See
MOULDER, LEGAL MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS RELATED TO DEVELOPMENT OF AN
ARTESIAN GROUND WATER RESERVOIR (Colo. Ground Water Cir.: No. 6) 5
(1962); Piper & Thomas, Hydrology and Water Law: What Is Their
Future Common Ground? in WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW (Legislative
Research Center, Univ. of Mich. Law School) 7, 21 (1958); Clark, supra
note 72, at 178; Clark, New Water Law Problems and Old Public Law
Principles, 32 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 437 (1960); Hutchins, Ground Water
Legislation, 30 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 416 (1958); McHendrie, supra note 76;
Maloney & Plager. supra note 72, at 753; Shurtz, Some Thoughts on Ground
Water Development in Kansas, 32 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 515 (1960).
79. Moses, writing in BITTINGER & MOSES, states "There are, however, scientific tools which can materially aid the litigants and the courts in arriving
at sound conclusons, based upon fact rather than speculaton." BITTINGER &
MOSES, supra note 10, at III-10. See Fischer, supra note 7, at 521; Harnsberger, Nebraska Ground Water Problems, 42 NEB. L. REV. 721, 744 (1963);
Moses, supra note 7, at 283; Wiel, supra note 72, at 369; Young & Bredehoeft, supra note 72, at 536.
One of the results of such a realization is the demand for a correlation of
the use of ground and surface water. See Clark, supra note 78, at 439;
HOF, at 182-84; Harnsberger, supra note 79, at 744; Hutchins, supra note
78, at 426; Maloney & Plager, supra note 72, at 753-56.
80. TRELEASE, supra note 21, at 457, quoting WALTON, GROUNDWATER RESOURCE
EVALUATION 29 (1970).
81. Comment, Appropriation and Colorado's Ground Water: A Continuing
Dilemma? supra note 78, at 134.
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Hutchins states that while ground water in common parlance is "all water in the ground" when dealing with water
law rights some subsurface water is beyond consideration
and thus defines ground water as "all water in the ground
that is free to move by gravity and to enter wells, is capable
of being extracted from the ground, and is susceptible of
practicable legal control." 2
The JurisdictionalHurdle
The major problem faced by any state seeking an equitable apportionment of the ground waters underlying more
than one state is the apparent jurisdictional hurdle which
the Supreme Court has established with regard to surface
waters-a threatened harm of "serious magnitude ... established by clear and convincing evidence."83 Thus the plaintiff state, acting under this heavy burden of proof, must establish that the defendant state's use or threatened use poses
such serious dangers that the Supreme Court must act.
Such a requirement suggests a three fold problem: (1)
Is the state of technical science capable of making such a
determination? (2) Is the cost of such a determination within the reach of the potential litigants or does it make a resort
to litigation prohibitive? (3) Is the Supreme Court capable
of dealing with the sophisticated and technical nature of the
data which the briefs and Master's Report would present to
the Court?
Litigation involving ground water poses far more difficult problems than those which arise in conflicts over surface
water. In the words of Krieger and Banks:
[T]he hydrology of ground water is complex
and dynamic. The amount of water that may be
safely extracted from a ground water basin is not a
fixed quantity, but may vary within rather wide
limits as man's activities increase or decrease the
supply to and disposal from the ground water body.
These activities include, among other things, artificial recharge, regulation of stream flow by sur82. Hutchins, supra note 78, at 416.
83. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921).
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face storage, vegetal cover changes, extension of
sewerage systems, paving of stream channels, sealing of the ground surface by the spread of
urbanization.84
While the ability of man to know the extent and nature
of the water which lies beneath the surface has been subject
to some doubt in the past,8" modern commentators indicate
that such information is well within our grasp.
One writer has asserted that the scientific tools necessary to allow the courts to arrive at conclusions based upon
fact rather than speculation are already available.8" Referring to the use of electric analog and digital computer models
as well as radioactive tracers, Moses asserts that the courts
can no longer refuse to act with respect to the nation's ground
waters. Two other writers similarly propound that technological advances have been made with regard to monitoring
and measuring devices as well as mathematical modeling of
hydrological systems.8 "
In a recent article, Harnsberger, Oeltjen and Fischer
wrote that "groundwater is no longer a hidden, secret resource; electric-analog, digital and mathematical models
which have become common hydrogeologic management tools,
can forecast long-term effects of probable withdrawals and
recharge." 8
84. Krieger & Banks, Ground Water Basin Management, 50 CAL. L. REV. 56, 57
(1962).
85. McDOUGAL & HABER, PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND 993 (1948), states:
The hydrologic data required for adequate information about
supply, evaporation and movement of ground water are difficult
to obtain and the courts do not have adequate staffs to do the
necessary gathering job. Consequently the parties must supply
the experts at great expense. These too frequently can do no better
than guess, for adequate information usually requires long term
collection of data on the interdependences of water, weather and
land-use in a particular locality. Moreover, the courts which have
a long record of ignoring scientific development in the field and
are certainly not expert agencies from an engineering perspective,
gain little from listening to the opposing views of scientists hired
by the parties.
86. BITTINGER & MosEs, supra note 10, at III-10.
87. Young & Bredehoeft, supra note 72, at 536. An interesting limitation to
Young & Bredehoeft's rather optimistic conclusion as to the predictive
ability of their digital model is, as stated in their article: "One is limited
only by his knowledge of the geology." Id. at 541.
88. HOF, at 184.
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However, while the commentators appear as one with
regard to the ability of modern science to obtain the requisite
ground water information, the expense of such information
may be prohibitive. Harnsberger, Oeltjen and Fischer assert that one reason for the resort by contestants over
ground water to prelitigation agreement is that "the
expense of obtaining the necessary hydrologic evidence
is so expensive .... ""
One commentator, referring to the California experience
in the adjudication of water rights, states that litigation involves costs "in excess of a quarter of a million dollars.'"
Listing the expenses involved as "the fact finding process,
appointment and payment of a referee, attorney's fees, and
court costs," Reis does not mention what portion of the cost
is attributable to determining the hydrological matters in
question, a cost which is-given the complex and sophisticated systems involved in the determination--extremely expensive." Harnsberger, Oeltjen and Fischer write, referring
to Corker's work, that adjudications administered by water
masters are "enormously expensive." 2
89. Id. at 240.
90. Reis, supra note 72, at 79.
91. Id. The cost of litigating City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando,
14 Cal. 3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250, 1269-70, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975), was in
excess of $493,200. U. S. Senator Clifford P. Hansen recently stated that
the Madison Formation study contemplated by the U.S. Geological Survey
would necessitate a first year expenditure of at least $2.3 million dollars
with an expected total cost of $9 million. The expenses for the first year
will include, in Senator Hansen's words:
$50,000 for purchase and computer analysis of geophysical logs;
$175,000 for gauging stations on selected streams and water-monitoring and water quality networks; $200,000 for field data collection, surface and subsurface mapping, and analysis of geophysical
streamflow, water level, and other data; $50,000 for geochemical
and isotopic study relating the quality of water in aquifers, flow
patterns and the composition of aquifers; $25,000 for vertical
seismic profiling; $1,775,000 for test drilling, coring and hydraulic
testing and geophysical logging of test holes; and $25,000 for calibration and refining of a preliminary digital model.
Press Release, Office of U. S. Senator Clifford P. Hansen (Aug. 27, 1975).
One cost not directly a part of the expense of litigation, but certainly a
part of the cost attributable to a suit is what Reis refers to as "the economic detriment induced by the 'time lag'" involved in the adjudication
process. Reis mentions the fifteen years necessary to settle Pasadena, yet
such a period pales by comparison with the forty-two years of dispute
between Colorado and Kansas, a dispute which finally ended with an interstate compact. Reis, supra note 72, at 78-79. See also Fischer, supra note 7,
at 544.
92. HOF, at 208.
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The tendency of the Supreme Court in the past to apportion the costs among the parties may to some extent ease the
burden posed by the high cost of hydrological information.
However, the possibility of dismissal prior to an apportionment and the resultant burden of the costs upon the plaintiff state could discourage a resort to the Court.
Assuming the availability and accessability of the hydrological information necessary for an action of one state
against another over interstate ground water, and setting
aside, for the moment, the unquestionably high cost of obtaining the data, there remains a further question as to the
ability of the Court to effectively deal with such information.
The cases involving interstate streams dealt not with unseen
waters, whose presence, amount, direction of flow and quality
were determined by digital computer simulation, but with a
stream whose condition can be monitored by fairly unsophisticated and straight forward methods. Yet the Master's
Reports in such cases were extensive. In Kansas v. Colorado,
the testimony covered 8,559 typewritten pages with 122 exhibits and 347 witnesses. 3 In Colorado v. Kansas, the evidence consisted of "some seven thousand typewritten pages
'94
of testimony and 368 exhibits covering thousands of pages.
Certainly the extensiveness and complexity of such evidence
has caused the Court some uneasiness in settling disputes
over interstate surface waters:
The reason for judicial caution in adjudicating the
relative rights of states in such cases is that ...
they involve the interests of quasi-sovereigns, present complicated and delicate questions, and, due to
the possibility of future change of conditions, necessitate expert administration rather than judicial
imposition of a hard and fast rule. * * * We say of
this case, as the court has said of interstate differences of like nature, that such mutual accommodation and agreement should, if possible, be the medium of settlement, instead of invocation of our adjudicatory power.9
93. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 105-06 (1907).
94. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 389 (1943).
95. Id. at 392.
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The ability of the Court to deal with such matters has
been questioned on numerous occasions by writers in the
area. Harnsberger, Oeltjen and Fischer, declaring that the
Court lacks the staff and expertise necessary for the formulation of a scientifically sound water plan, write: "In short,
the matter has passed beyond the competence of courts, and
future guidance must come from legislative leadership.""
Furthermore, these authors indicate that legislative bodies
are far better equipped than the courts to "evaluate empirical
data." Such a conclusion has been propounded by numerous
writers."8
The United States as an Indispensable Party
A jurisdictional requirement discussed above is that of
the voluntary joining of the United States when an indispensable party to such litigation. This requirement-in the absence of a voluntary intervention by the federal government
-could present a sizeable barrier to the plaintiff state seeking an equitable apportionment. The 'likelihood that the
United States would stand as an indispensable party to interstate ground water litigation appears increased given the
recent application of the federal reservation doctrine to
ground water." In the arid West where significant portions
of the states are federal lands, this likelihood is even
greater."'
The Requirement for Real and SubstantialHarm
The Supreme Court has required in surface water litigation that not only must the harm be of a serious magnitude
as seen by clear and convincing evidence, but it must be pres96. HOF, at 240.
97. Id. at 184.
98. See Fischer, supra note 7, at 528; Johnson, Adjudication of Water Rights,
42 TEx. L. REv. 121, 129 (1963): Comment, Appropriation and Colorado's
Ground Water: A Continuing Dilemina? supra note 72, at 141.
99. United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1974); Comment, Federally Reserved Rights to Underground Water-A Rising Question in the
Arid West, 1973 UTAH L. REv. 43 (1973).
100.

One Third of the Nation's Land, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE
CONGRESS BY THE

PUBLIc

LAND LAW REVIEW

COMMISSION

(Washington,

D.C.) 327 (June 1970), contains the following percentages of lands in
western states owned by the federal government: Montana-29.6; Wyoming--48.2; Colorado--36.3; New Mexico--33.9; Arizona--44.6; Nevada86.4; Utah-66.5; Idaho-63.9; Washington-29.4; Oregon-52.2; California-44.3; Alaska-95.3.
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ent and substantial, not merely potential. This requirement
and the possibility of its application in interstate litigation
over ground water poses serious problems for the plaintiff
state. While there are very real harms which can result
from the overuse of ground water, 1 ' such harms are not
readily apparent.0 2 Thus, Krieger and Banks in discussing
the California experience, write "suits were instituted only
after the ground water basins were in real trouble."1 '
If the Supreme Court continues to apply the "real and
substantial harm" requirement and to dismiss any suit involving "potential" harm, the state which, seeing extensive
ground water use in a neighboring state and fearing that
such use would endanger its own ground and surface water
sources, seeks an equitable apportionment by the Supreme
Court would be unable to litigate the matter until the harm
became apparent, that is, until such action was too late.
101. Aside from the actual physical exhaustion of an underground basin's supplies, other possible consequences include, in Reis' words:
(1) As the water levels declined, the cost of pumping the water
to the surface would increase. At some point, the water levels
would have declined so that it would become impractical to further
utilize the basin as a source of water supplies.
(2) As the water levels declined, there would be a structural
change in the basin due to a compacting or settling of the aquifying layers resulting in a loss of storage area.
(3) Lesser quantities of water would increase the mineral content
per unit, thereby making the quality of water unsuitable for use.
(4) Coastal basins, those which border on the Pacific Ocean, would
be subject to sea water intrusion as their water levels declined.
Sea water would permanently destroy the utility of the basin by
debasing the quality of the water.
Reis, supra note 72, at 57.
Overuse can affect surface stream rights as well as depress water
tables to unrechargeable depths. Comment, Appropriation and Colorado's
Ground Water. A Continuing Dilemma? supra note 72, at 134. See BiTrINGER & MOSES, supra note 10, at II-1; Hutchins, supra note 78, at 436;
Maloney & Plager, supra note 72, at 757-58; Young & Bredehoeft, supra
note 72, at 535.
102. One of the major difficulties in recognizing the dangers which certain water
uses pose to a ground water source or to the water resource in general is
the speed at which subsurface water moves:
[G]roundwater usually moves snailike and pumping from wells
does little to speed its lateral flow. In Nebraska, groundwater
percolates slowly, generally not more than several feet each day
and in most instances only about 300 feet annually. At a velocity
of 300 feet per year, water moves only one mile in seventeen years.
In contrast, streanflow down the Platte River moves at approximately twenty-five miles per day.
HOF at 183.
See Young & Bredehoeft, supra note 72, at 538; Comment, Appropriation
and Colorado's Ground Water: A Continuing Dilemma? supra note 72, at
138-39.
103. Krieger & Banks, supra note 84, at 66.
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However, the Court's willingness to equitably apportion
in Nebraska v. Wyoming despite the rather far off nature of
the threatened harm may foretell a willingness on the part
of the Court to make an early determination of the claims of
the plaintiff state."' This seems particularly so in the light
of the severe nature of the results of the overuse of ground
water.
More Than A Barren Right
However, a state which seeks an equitable apportionment, not on the basis of some harm to come from its neighbor's use of common ground water, but because of the plaintiff state's own desire to use the water, may suffer dismissal
as a result of the Court's "barren right" or "technical right"
language." 5 Thus the plaintiff state must show that some
use to which it had applied the water will suffer due to the
defendant state's actions and the ground water must therefore be apportioned between the states' uses.
Consequently a state contemplating litigation and the
expense incident to such litigation must consider whether
its position as the possessor of a mere technical right warrants a suit. It would appear that such a realization would
bring to the state an awareness that the best manner of winning interstate ground water litigation is to put the ground
water to use. While this conclusion is an appropriate one
given the Court's failure to take from a state, water which
has been beneficially applied for use within that state, ground
water litigation may bring about a different result. Given
the possible damages which can occur due to an overdraft
of a ground water source, 06 the Court may be unwilling to
permit the use of such waters without an examination of
the potential threats.
Ground Water-Surface Water Correlation
In the past, the Supreme Court has indicated an unwillingness to discuss the correlation between ground and sur104. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 608-09 (1945).
105. See note 19 supra.
106. See note 101 supra.
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face water."0 7 Yet such a naive approach cannot continue.'
Numerous commentators have referred to the obvious relationship between surface and subsurface waters and the
need for a doctrine which takes into account such a relationship."0 9 In the light of such persuasive reasoning and in
recognition of the realities of hydrology, the Court will be
forced to correlate ground and surface water determining
what ground water is tributary or sufficiently tributary to
a stream as to be treated as surface water itself in its affect
thereon and what water is sufficiently removed as to be considered ground water in and of itself."0 While such a determination will be highly complex, it is essential to any equitable apportionment."'
Ground Water Doctrines
The various ground water doctrines which have arisen
among the states in varying degrees of application do not
appear to present a problem for ground water adjudication
between the states, given the ease with which the Supreme
Court applied equitable apportionment based on the factors
it deemed relevant whether the states involved were riparian
or prior appropriation.' 12 This conclusion appears to be in
accordance with that of Fischer, who in reference to ground
water writes, "it should not be thought that the Court would
107. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S.
517 (1936).
108. The Court has, in the past, touched upon the matter of the relationship between surface and ground water by its discussion of "seepage" and "percolation." See note 61 supra.
109. "[Slince subflow is but a part of the stream, rights can be obtained in it
separately only where no interference is made with the rights of surface
or other existing claimants on the stream." WEIL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE
WESTERN STATES 1018 (3rd ed. 1911). See Clark, supra note 78, at 439;
Harnsberger, supra note 79, at 744 - Hutchins, supra note 78, at 426, Moses,
supra note 7, at 296-300.
There is a serious question in the minds of some engineers as to
110.
whether there is truly any such thing as nontributary ground
water. Most engineers and geologists believe all water is tributary
to some stream, in some quantity, at some place and at some future
point in time.
BITTINGER & MOSES, supra note 10, at III-10.
111. The complexity of such an evaluation can be seen by reference to Young &
Bredehoeft's article. However, at least one court has alrady made such a
distinction. Whitten v. Coit, 153 Colo. 157, 385 P.2d 131 (1963); Safranek
v. Limon, 123 Colo. 330, 228 P.2d 975 (1951).
112. See note 36 supra, and accompanying text.
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have difficulty in apportioning the waters between states
with different water 'doctrines'., ,113
The Equity Factors
Assuming that the plaintiff state can meet the requirements of the Court for the exercise of its original jurisdiction
and can as well overcome the difficulties already discussed,
there appears little question but that the Court will seek to
apportion the water in question on much the same basis as
the Court has done in dealing with interstate surface streams.
The Court's willingness to examine such matters as the
states' economies, population and agricultural trends, climate, diligence and care in the use of such waters, the uses
to which the waters are applied, as well as return flow, has
been apparent in numerous cases involving interstate surface waters and will no doubt continue to be so in the future
with regard to ground water. As Fischer writes:
If the lower state can show that under the particular physical and climatic conditions prevailing,
and considering the consumptive use of water by
the various states, the character and rate of return
flows, the extent of established uses, the availability
of storage water (or water stored underground),
the damage to the respective areas expected to be
produced by continued unregulated withdrawals,
then the Supreme Court, upon the application of
one of the states, can be expected to impose upon
the states its own managerial concepts.""
CONCLUSION

If the commentators are correct in their conclusion that
the inactivity of the various states with regard to a correlation between ground and surface water in a compact type
solution is leading the states toward interstate litigation,
then the states which find themselves faced with no solution
but litigation are destined for years of costly, complicated
litigation. The result will please no one, least of all the
Master and the Court which will struggle with the difficult
113. Fischer, supra note 7, at 543.
114. Id. at 544-45.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1976

27

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 11 [1976], Iss. 1, Art. 3

130

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XI

questions that such a case will present. An interstate compact would, of course, be better, easier, and much less costly,
but to date the pressures have apparently been inadequate
to compel such action.
WILLIAM PERRY PENDLEY

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol11/iss1/3

28

